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The Mutual Influence of the 
Humanities and Social Sciences
4 Gender and the Meaning 
of Difference: Postmodernism 
and Psychology
Rachel T. Hare-Mustin & 
Jeanne Marecek
Conventional meanings of gender typically focus on differ­
ence, emphasizing how women differ from men. These differences have furnished 
support for the norm of male superiority. Until recently, psychological inquiry 
into gender has held to the construction of gender as difference. Thus, psycholo­
gists have focused on documenting differences between men and women, and 
their findings have served as scientific justification for male-female inequality 
(Lott, 1985; Morawski, 1985; Shields, 1975; Weisstein, 1971). When we examine the­
ories of psychotherapy, we find that they, too, have supported the cultural mean­
ings of gender (Hare-Mustin, 1983).
One recent line of inquiry by feminist psychologists has involved reexamining 
gender with the goal of deemphasizing difference by sorting out genuine male-fe­
male differences from stereotypes. Some examples include Janet Hyde’s (1981) 
meta-analyses of cognitive differences, Eleanor Maccoby and Carolyn Jacklin’s 
(1975) review of sex differences, and Jacquelynne Eccles’s work on math achieve­
ment (Eccles, 1989; Eccles & Jacobs, 1986). The results of this work dispute the 
contention that many male-female differences are universal, dramatic, or endur­
ing (Deaux, 1984; Unger, 1979; Wallston, 1981). Moreover, this line of inquiry sees 
the origins of difference as largely social and cultural rather than biological. Thus, 
most differences between males and females are seen as culturally specific and 
historically fluid.
Another line of inquiry, exemplified in recent feminist psychodynamic theories 
(e.g., Chodorow, 1978; Eichenbaum & Orbach, 1983; Miller, 1986), takes as its goal 
the reaffirmation of gender differences. Although these theories provide varying 
accounts of the origins of difference, they all emphasize deep-seated and endur­
ing differences between women and men in what is referred to as core self-struc­
ture, identity, and relational capacities. Other theorists have extended this work 
to suggest that these gender differences in psychic structure give rise to cognitive
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differences, such as differences in moral reasoning and in acquiring and organiz­
ing knowledge (cf. Belenky, Clinchy, Goldberger & Tarule, 1986; Gilligan, 1982; 
Keller, 1985). These theories represent differences between men and women as es­
sential, universal (at least within contemporary Western culture), highly dichoto­
mized, and enduring.
These two lines of inquiry have led to two widely held but incompatible repre­
sentations of gender: one that sees considerable similarity between males and fe­
males, and another that sees profound differences. Both groups of theorists have 
offered empirical evidence, primarily quantitative in the first case and qualitative 
in the second. We believe that it is unlikely that further empirical evidence will re­
solve the question of whether men and women are similar or different. The two 
lines of inquiry described here emerge from different intellectual traditions, con­
strue their domains of study differently, and rely on such different methods that 
consensus on a given set of conclusions seems unlikely. Moreover, even if consen­
sus were possible, the question of what constitutes differentness would remain.
What constitutes differentness is a vexing question for psychologists who study 
sex and gender. Research that focuses on average differences between men and 
women may produce one conclusion while research that focuses on the full range 
of variations and the overlap (or lack of overlap) at the extremes of the range may 
produce another (Luria, 1986). An illustration can make this clearer: Although on 
average, American men are several inches taller than American women, we can 
readily think of some men who are shorter than many or even most women. The 
size and direction of gender differences in social behaviors, such as aggression or 
helping, often vary according to the norms and expectations for men and women 
that are made salient by the setting in which the behavior takes place (Eagly & 
Crowley, 1986; Eagly 8c Steffen, 1986). Studies in experimental laboratories can 
produce different results from field observations in real settings. Even more trou­
bling, the very criteria for deciding what should constitute a difference as opposed 
to a similarity are disputed, flow much difference makes a difference? Even the 
anatomical differences between men and women seem trivial when humans are 
compared to daffodils or ducks.
What are we to make of the difference versus no difference debate? Rather than 
debating which of these representations of gender is “true,” we shift to the 
metaperspective provided by postmodernism. From this perspective, we can en­
tertain new and possibly more fruitful questions about representations of gender, 
including the political and social functions that the difference and no difference 
positions serve. This perspective opens the way to alternative representations of 
gender that would raise new questions or recast old ones for psychologists.
Postmodernism and Meaning
Two recent intellectual movements, constructivism and deconstruction, challenge 
the idea of a single meaning of reality and a single truth. Rather than concerning 
themselves with a search for “the truth,” they inquire instead about the way 
meanings are negotiated, the control over meanings by those in authority, and
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how meanings are represented in language. The current interest in constructivism 
and deconstruction reflects the growing skepticism about the positivist tradition 
in science and essentialist theories of truth and meaning (Rorty, 1979)- Both con­
structivism and deconstruction challenge these positions, asserting that the social 
context shapes knowledge, and that meanings are historically situated and con­
structed and reconstructed through the medium of language.
The connection between meaning and power has been a focus of postmodern­
ist thinkers (Foucault, 1973; Jameson, 1981). Their inquiry into meaning focuses 
especially on language as the medium of cognitive life and communication. Lan­
guage is seen not simply as a mirror of reality or a neutral tool (Taggart, 1985; 
Wittgenstein, i960; 1967). As Bruner (1986) points out, language “imposes a point 
of view not only about the world to which it refers but toward the use of the mind 
in respect to this world” (121). Language highlights certain features of the objects 
it represents, certain meanings of the situations it describes. “The word—no mat­
ter how experimental or tentative or metaphoric—tends to replace the things be­
ing described” (Spence, 1987,3). Once designations in language become accepted, 
one is constrained by them not only in communicating ideas to others, but in the 
generation of ideas as well (Bloom, 1981). Language inevitably structures one’s 
own experience of reality as well as the experience of those to whom one commu­
nicates. Just as in any interaction we cannot “not communicate,” so at some level 
we are always influencing one another and ourselves through language.
Meaning-making and control over language are important resources held by 
those in power. Like other valuable resources, they are not distributed equitably 
across the social hierarchy. Indeed, Barthes (1972) has called language a sign sys­
tem used by the powerful to label, define, and rank. Language is never innocent. 
Throughout history, dominant groups have asserted their authority over lan­
guage. Our purpose here is to draw attention to the fact that men’s influence over 
language is greater than that of women; we do not argue that women have had no 
influence over language. Within most social groups, males have had privileged ac­
cess to education and thus have had higher rates of literacy than females; this re­
mains true in many developing countries today (Newland, 1979) • Men’s domi­
nance in academic institutions influences the social production of knowledge, 
including the concepts and terms in which people think about the world 
(Andersen, 1983). In addition, more men are published and men control the print 
and electronic media (Strainchamps, 1974). The arbiters of language usage are 
primarily men, from Samuel Johnson and Noah Webster to H. L. Mencken and 
Strunk and White.
When meaning-making through language is concentrated among certain 
groups in society, the meanings put forth can only be partial, because they ex­
clude the experiences of other social groups. Yet the dominant group’s influence 
over meaning-making is such that partial meanings are represented as if they 
were complete. In the instance of male control over language, the use of the ge­
neric masculine is a ready example of representing a partial object, the masculine, 
as complete, that is, as encompassing both male and female. Although not all men
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have influence over language, for those who do, such authority confers the power 
to create the world from their point of view, in the image of their desires.
In this chapter, we try to rethink the psychology of gender from the vantage 
point of constructivism and deconstruction. We first take up constructivism. We 
examine various constructions of gender and identify the problems associated 
with the predominant meaning of gender, that of male-female difference. We then 
turn to deconstruction. We show how a deconstructive approach can reveal alter­
native meanings associated with gender. In therapy, deconstruction can be a 
means of disrupting clients’ understanding of reality by revealing alternative 
meanings. New meanings offer new possibilities for action and thus can foster 
change. We do not provide an exhaustive review of sex differences in psychology 
or propose a new theory of gender. Rather, we shift the discussion to a 
metatheoretical level in order to consider gender theorizing. Our purpose is not 
to answer the question of what is the meaning of gender but to examine where the 
question has taken us thus far and then to move on to new areas of inquiry.
The Construction of Reality
Constructivism asserts that we do not discover reality, we invent it (Watzlawick, 
1984). Our experience does not directly reflect what is out there but is a selecting, 
ordering, and organizing of it. Knowing is a search for “fitting” ways of behaving 
and thinking (Von Glaserfeld, 1984). Rather than passively observing reality, we 
actively construct the meanings that frame and organize our perceptions and ex­
perience. Thus, our understanding of reality is a representation, not an exact rep­
lica, of what is out there. Representations of reality are shared meanings that de­
rive from shared language, history, and culture. Rorty (1979) suggests that the 
notion of accurate representation is a compliment we pay to those beliefs that are 
successful in helping us do what we want to do. The realities of social life are 
products of language and agreed-on meanings.
Constructivism challenges the scientific tradition of positivism, which holds 
that reality is fixed and can be observed directly, uninfluenced by the observer 
(Gergen, 1985; Sampson, 1985; Segal, 1986). As Heisenberg (1952) has pointed out, 
a truly objective world, devoid of all subjectivity, would have no one to observe it. 
Constructivism also challenges the presumption of positivist science that it is 
possible to distinguish facts from values. For constructivists, values and attitudes 
determine what are taken to be facts (Howard, 1985). It is not that formal laws and 
theories in psychology are wrong or useless; rather, as Kuhn (1962) asserted, they 
are explanations based on a set of agreed-on social conventions. Whereas positiv­
ism asks what are the facts, constructivism asks what are the assumptions; 
whereas positivism asks what are the answers, constructivism asks what are the 
questions.
The positivist tradition holds that science is the exemplar of the right use of 
reason, neutral in its methods, socially beneficial in its results (Flax, 1987). Histor­
ically, the scientific movement challenged the canons of traditional belief and the 
authority of church and state. Science was a reform movement that struggled to
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supplant faith as the sole source of knowledge by insisting on the unity of experi­
ence and knowing. For Western society today, science has largely displaced church 
and state authority so that scientific has itself become a euphemism for proper.
Constructivism holds that scientific knowledge, like all other knowledge, can­
not be disinterested or politically neutral. In psychology, constructivism, drawing 
on the ideas of Bateson and Maturana, has influenced epistemological develop­
ments in systems theories of the family (Dell, 1985). Constructivist views have also 
been put forth in developmental psychology (Bronfenbrenner, Kessel, Kessen & 
White, 1986; Scarr, 1985), in the psychology of women (Unger, 1983, and this 
book), and in the study of human sexuality (Tiefer, 1987). Constructivist views 
also form the basis of the social constructionism movement in social psychology, 
which draws inspiration from symbolic anthropology, ethnomethodology, and 
related movements in sociology and anthropology (Gergen, 1985; Kessler & 
McKenna, 1978).
From a constructivist perspective, theories of gender, like all scientific theories, 
are representations of reality that are organized within particular assumptive 
frameworks and that reflect certain interests. Below, we examine gender theoriz­
ing in psychology and indicate some of the assumptions and issues that a con­
structivist approach makes apparent.
The Construction of Gender as Difference
From a constructivist standpoint, the real nature of male and female cannot be 
determined. Constructivism focuses our attention on representations of gender 
rather than on gender itself We note first that most languages, including our 
own, are elaborately gendered. Gender differentiation is a preeminent phenome­
non of symbolic life and communication in our society, although this is not the 
case in all languages and cultures. Nonetheless, the English language still lacks ad­
equate terms for speaking of each gender. Male-female has the advantage of refer­
ring to individuals across the entire life span, but the terms imply biological char­
acteristics and fail to distinguish humans from other species. Men-women is more 
restrictive, referring specifically to humans, but it has the disadvantage of omit­
ting childhood and adolescence. In this chapter, we use men and women for the 
most part, but we use male and female when we wish to include individuals at any 
point in the life span.
The very term gender illustrates the power of linguistic categories to determine 
what we know of the world. The use of gender in contexts other than discussions 
of grammar is quite recent. Gender was appropriated by contemporary American 
feminists to refer to the social quality of distinctions between the sexes (Scott, 
1985). Gender is used in contrast to terms like sex and sexual difference for the ex­
plicit purpose of creating a space in which socially mediated differences between 
men and women can be explored apart from biological differences (Unger, 1979). 
The germinal insight of feminist thought was the discovery that woman is a social 
category. So although sexual differences can be reduced to the reproductive sys­
tem in males (sperm production) and females (ovulation, pregnancy, childbirth,
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and lactation), sex differences do not account for gender, for women’s social, po­
litical, and economic subordination or women’s child care responsibilities.
From the vantage point of constructivism, theories of gender are representa­
tions based on conventional distinctions. In our view, such theories embody one 
of two contrasting biases, alpha bias and beta bias (Hare-Mustin, 1987). Alpha 
bias is the tendency to exaggerate differences; beta bias is the tendency to mini­
mize or ignore differences.
The alpha-beta schema is in some ways analogous to that in scientific hypothe­
sis testing in experimental psychology and thus is a schema familiar to psycholo­
gists. In hypothesis testing, alpha or Type 1 error involves reporting a significant 
difference when one does not exist; beta or Type 2 error involves overlooking a 
significant difference when one does exist. In our formulation, the term bias re­
fers not to the probability of error (which would imply that there is a correct posi­
tion), but to a systematic slant or inclination to emphasize certain aspects of ex­
perience and overlook other aspects. This inclination or tendency is presumably 
related to the standpoint of the knower, that is, the position where he or she is lo­
cated within and as part of the context. Thus, the standpoint of the knower neces­
sarily shapes her or his view of reality. Far from deterring the knower from gain­
ing knowledge, taking a standpoint can be a positive strategy for generating new 
knowledge (Hartsock, 1985). Our use of the term bias underscores our contention 
that all ideas about difference are social constructs; none can be mirrors of reality. 
Alpha and beta bias can be seen in representations of gender, race, class, age, and 
the like that either emphasize or overlook difference. Here we use the alpha-beta 
schema to examine recent efforts to theorize gender.
Alpha Bias
Alpha bias is the exaggeration of differences. The view of male and female as dif­
ferent and opposite and thus as having mutually exclusive qualities transcends 
Western culture and has deep historical roots. Ideas of male-female opposition 
are present in Eastern thought and throughout Western philosophy, including the 
writings of Aristotle, Aquinas, Bacon, and Descartes, as well as the writings of lib­
eral theorists such as Locke and romanticists such as Rousseau (Grimshaw, 1986). 
Throughout Western history, woman has been regarded as the repository of 
nonmasculine traits, an “otherness” men assign to women.
The scientific model developed by Francis Bacon was based on the distinction 
between “male” reason and its “female” opposites—passion, lust, and emotion 
(Keller, 1985). Because women were restricted to the private sphere, they did not 
have access to the knowledge available in the public realm. The knowledge 
women did have, such as witchcraft, was disparaged or repudiated. As Evelyn Fox 
Keller points out, women’s knowledge was associated with insatiable lust; men’s 
knowledge was assumed to be chaste. In Bacon’s model of science, nature was cast 
in the image of the female, to be subdued, subjected to the penetrating male gaze, 
and forced to yield up her secrets (cf. Keller, 1985; Merchant, 1980). Bacon’s views
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are but one manifestation of the long-standing association of women with nature 
and emotion and men with reason, technology, and civilization (Ortner, 1974). 
The material body has been a symbol of human limitation and decay since at least 
early Christian times. Hence, men sought to be other than their bodies, to tran­
scend their bodies. They dissociated themselves from their bodies and associated 
women with materiality, the sphere of nature, and the body (Butler, 1987). The 
opposition of reason and emotion, as well as the opposition of civilization and 
nature, emphasized in the Enlightenment, served in later times to reinforce liber­
alism’s emphasis on rationality as the capacity that distinguishes humans from 
animals (Grimshaw, 1986).
In psychology, alpha bias can be readily seen in most psychodynamic theories. 
Freudian theory is not neutral about sexual differences but imposes meanings. It 
takes masculinity and male anatomy as the human standard; femininity and fe­
male anatomy are deviations from that standard. Thus, Freud characterized 
women’s bodies as not having a penis rather than as having the female external 
genitalia. Similarly, he portrayed feminine character in terms of its deficiencies 
relative to masculine character. The Jungian idea of the animus and the anima 
also places the masculine and the feminine in opposition.
More recent psychodynamic theories also depict women as sharply divergent 
from men. For example, Erikson (1964) wrote that female identity is predicated 
on “inner space,” a somatic design that “harbors ... a biological, psychological, 
and ethical commitment to take care of human infancy ...” (586), and a sensitive 
indwelling. Male identity is associated with “outer space,” which involves intru­
siveness, excitement, and mobility, leading to achievement, political domination, 
and adventure seeking. In Lacan’s (1985) poststructuralist view, women are “out­
side” language, public discourse, culture, and the law. For Lacan, the female is de­
fined not by what is, but by the absence or lack of the phallus as the prime signi­
fies In these ways psychodynamic theories overlook similarities between males 
and females and instead emphasize differences.
Parsons’s sex-role theory, which dominated the social theories of the 1950s and 
1960s, also emphasizes male-female differences (Parsons & Bales, 1955). The very 
language of sex-role theory powerfully conveys the sense that men’s and women’s 
roles are fixed and dichotomous, as well as separate and reciprocal (Thorne, 
1982). Parsons asserted that men were instrumental and women were expressive, 
that is, men were task-oriented and women were oriented toward feelings and re­
lationships. Parsons’s sex-role theory was hailed as providing a scientific basis for 
relegating men and women to separate spheres. Men’s nature suited them for paid 
work and public life; women’s nature suited them for family work and home life. 
Thus women became first in “goodness” by putting their own needs secondary to 
those of their families and altruistically donating their services to others 
(Lipman-Blumen, 1984). Parsons believed that separate spheres for men and 
women were functional in reducing competition and conflict in the family and 
thus preserving harmony. The role definitions that Parsons put forward came to
56 Rachel T. Hare-Mustin & Jeanne Marecek
serve as criteria for distinguishing normal individuals and families from those 
who were pathological or even pathogenic (cf Broverman, Broverman, Clarkson, 
Rosenkrantz & Vogel, 1970). The criteria associated with sex-role differentiation 
continue to be applied to family structure and functioning in such theories as 
contemporary exchange theory (Nye, 1982) and structural family therapy 
(Minuchin, 1974).
Alpha bias, or the inclination to emphasize differences, can also be seen in fem­
inist psychodynamic theories (cf. Chodorow, 1978; Eichenbaum & Orbach, 1983; 
Gilligan, 1982; Miller, 1986). According to Nancy Chodorow (1978), boys and girls 
undergo contrasting experiences of identity formation during their early years 
under the social arrangement in which the care of infants is provided exclusively 
by women. Her influential work, which is based on object-relations theory, argues 
that girls’ early experiences involve similarity and attachment to their mothers 
while boys’ early experiences emphasize difference, separateness, and indepen­
dence. These experiences are thought to result in broad-ranging gender differ­
ences in identity, personality structure, and psychic needs in adulthood. Women 
develop a deep-seated motivation to have children, whereas men develop the ca­
pacity to participate in the alienating work structures of advanced capitalism. 
Thus, according to Chodorow, the social structure produces gendered personali­
ties that reproduce the social structure. Although Chodorow locates the psycho­
dynamics of personality development temporally and situationally in Western in­
dustrial capitalism, psychologists who draw on her work often overlook this point 
concerning the social context. Her work is used to assert that there are essential 
differences between women and men and to view these, rather than the social 
structure, as the basis for gender roles (cf Chernin, 1986; Eichenbaum & Orbach, 
1983; Schlachet, 1984; Jordan & Surrey, 1986). In any case, both Chodorow’s theory 
and the work of her followers emphasize gender difference and thus exemplify al­
pha bias.
In her approach to women’s development, Carol Cilligan (1982) harks back to 
Parsons’s duality, viewing women as relational and men as instrumental and ra­
tional. Her theory of women’s moral development echoes some of the gender dif­
ferences asserted by Freud (1964) and Erikson (1964). She describes female iden­
tity as rooted in connections to others and relationships. She views female 
morality as based on an ethic of care and responsibility rather than fairness and 
rights. Unlike Freud, however, she views women’s differences from men in a posi­
tive light.
Both traditional psychodynamic theories and the recently developed feminist 
psychodynamic theories emphasize differences between men and women while 
overlooking the similarities between them. Whereas the emphasis on difference in 
traditional theories went hand in hand with a devaluation of what was seen as fe­
male, feminists’ emphasis on difference is coupled with a positive evaluation of 
women’s attributes. Their emphasis on women’s unique capacities for relation­
ships and on the richness of women’s inner experience has been an important re­
source for the movement within feminism known as cultural feminism. Cultural
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feminism encourages the development and expression of a women’s culture, cele­
brates the special qualities of women, and values relationships among women.
Beta Bias
The inclination to ignore or minimize differences, beta bias, has been less promi­
nent in psychological theory than alpha bias, and thus our treatment of it is nec­
essarily briefer. One example of beta bias in theory development is the practice, 
common until recent decades, of drawing generalizations about human behavior, 
adult development, and personality from observations limited to males 
(Wallston, 1981). Male experience was assumed to represent all experience. This is 
an instance of beta bias insofar as generalizations about human experience based 
only on the male life course assume that women’s experiences are no different 
than men’s. Such generalizations offer only a partial view of humanity.
Another common instance of beta bias is the tendency to overlook both the 
differences in the social and economic resources that men and women typically 
have at their disposal as well as the differences in the social meanings and conse­
quences of their actions. Thus, beta bias can be seen in social policies that provide 
equivalent benefits for men and women but overlook their disparate needs 
(Weitzman, 1985). Two examples, which we take up later, are comparable parental 
leave and no-fault divorce. Beta bias can also be seen in educational and thera­
peutic programs that focus on transforming the individual while leaving the so­
cial context unchanged. For example, some programs purport to groom women 
for personal or professional success by providing training in what are deemed 
male behaviors or skills, such as assertiveness, authoritative speech patterns, or 
certain managerial styles. Thus, if a woman wants to succeed as a manager, she is 
instructed to copy the demeanor and actions of successful men. Such programs 
presume that a certain manner of speaking or acting will elicit the same reaction 
from others regardless of the sex of the actor. This can be questioned (Gervasio & 
Crawford, 1989; Marecek & Hare-Mustin, 1987); for example, asking for a date, a 
classic task in assertiveness training, is judged differently for a woman than a man 
(Muehlenhard, 1983).
Beta bias can also be seen in theories of gender that represent masculine and 
feminine roles of traits as counterparts, as the construct of psychological androg­
yny does. The idea of masculinity and femininity as counterparts implies their 
symmetry and equivalence and thus obscures gender differences in power and so­
cial value. Sandra Bern’s (1976) theory of psychological androgyny, which called 
for the creation of more balanced and healthy individuals by integrating positive 
masculine and feminine qualities, implies the equivalence of such qualities 
(Morawski, 1985; Worell, 1978).
Bern’s original hypotheses suggested that individuals who identified themselves 
as highly feminine and those who identified themselves as highly masculine 
would be equally handicapped in performing “cross-sex” tasks and equally disad­
vantaged in terms of psychological well-being. But attempts to demonstrate this 
empirically did not yield such symmetrical effects (Morawski, 1987); rather, a 
masculine sex-role orientation tended to be associated with greater adaptiveness.
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as well as higher scores on indices of self-esteem and other aspects of psychologi­
cal well-being. This is perhaps not surprising: If society values masculine qualities 
more highly than feminine qualities, individuals who have (or perceive them­
selves to have) those qualities should feel better about themselves. This is not to 
say that every quality associated with masculinity is regarded as positive. Aggres­
sion, for instance, is deplored outside of combat situations and competitive 
sports.
Beta bias can also be seen in theories of family functioning that ignore gender. 
In all societies, four primary axes along which hierarchies are established are 
class, race, gender, and age. Within families, class and race usually are constant, 
but gender and age vary. Family systems theories, however, disregard gender and 
view generation (that is, age) as the central organizing principle in the family 
(Hare-Mustin, 1987). Such theories emphasize the importance of the boundaries 
that define the differences in power and responsibility between the parental gen­
eration and the children. In so doing, they deflect attention from questions about 
the distribution of power and resources within generations of a family. Are moth­
ers as powerful as fathers? Are daughters afforded the same resources and degree 
of autonomy as sons? By regarding all members of a generation as equal interact­
ing participants in the family system, systems theories put forward a neutered 
representation of family life (Libow, 1985).
The Question of Utility
Rather than debate the correctness of various representations of gender, the 
“true” nature of which cannot be known, constructivism turns to the utility or 
consequences of these representations. How, we ask, do representations of gender 
provide the meanings and symbols that organize scientific and therapeutic prac­
tice in psychology? What are the consequences of representing gender in ways 
that either emphasize or minimize male-female differences? We use the alpha- 
beta schema as a framework for discussing the utility of gender theories.
The Utility of Alpha Bias
Because alpha bias has been the prevailing representation of gender we take up 
the question of its utility first. Alpha bias has had a number of effects on our un­
derstanding of gender. An important positive consequence of alpha bias, or focus­
ing on differences between women and men, is that it has allowed some theorists 
to assert the worth of certain so-called feminine qualities. This assertion has the 
positive effect of countering the cultural devaluation of women and encouraging 
greater self-acceptance among women (Echols, 1983). Further, the focus on wom­
en’s special qualities by some feminists has also prompted a critique of those cul­
tural values that excuse or even encourage aggression, extol the pursuit of self-in­
terest, and foster narrow individualism. It has furnished an impetus for the 
development of a feminist social ethics and for a variety of related philosophical 
endeavors (Eisenstein, 1983). The emphasis on women’s differences from men fos­
ters a corresponding appreciation of the commonalities women share, an appreci-
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ation that can help to generate positive emotional bonds among women. Sister­
hood and solidarity have spurred collective action by women to gain recognition 
and power.
Unfortunately, exaggerating gender difference does not always support the 
aims of feminism. By construing women as different and devaluing them, alpha 
bias fosters solidarity between men by construing women as a deviant out-group, 
which can then be devalued. In Durkheim’s terms, deviance supports in-group 
solidarity. Defining a sharp boundary between male and female supports the sta­
tus quo by exacerbating male fears of being viewed as feminine. This serves to en­
force conformity by males to masculine stereotypes. Moreover, exaggerating 
women’s difference from men fosters the view of woman as the Other (Beauvoir, 
1953). Further, this distancing and alienating view of women by the dominant 
male culture opens the way to treating women as objects, as is apparent in certain 
pornographic images and in much of the physical and sexual abuse of females.
Alpha bias also supports the status quo by denying that change is needed in the 
structure of work and family life (Gilder, 1987; Marshner, 1982). So, for example, 
traditionalists assert that women are not as intellectually capable as men, women 
are temperamentally better suited for care-taking roles and, as was argued in the 
Sears sex discrimination case, women prefer not to undertake stereotyped male 
roles (Erikson, 1964; Rosenberg, 1986; Rossi, 1984). Women’s presumed differ­
ences from men are used to justify unequal treatment. Yet, as Patricia Mills (1987) 
suggests, it is women’s confinement to the family that secures her difference. The 
possibility that it is the unequal treatment that might lead to the apparent differ­
ences between men and women is hidden from view.
The idea that male and female are opposites masks inequality between men 
and women as well as conflict between them. By construing rationality as an es­
sential male quality and relatedness as an essential female quality, for example, 
such theories as those of Gilligan and Parsons conceal the possibility that those 
qualities result from social inequities and power differences. Men’s propensity to 
reason from principles might stem from the fact that the principles were formu­
lated to promote their interests; women’s concern with relationships can be un­
derstood as a need to please others that arises from lack of power (Hare-Mustin & 
Marecek, 1986). Typically, those in power advocate rules, discipline, control, and 
rationality, while those without power espouse relatedness and compassion. 
Thus, in husband-wife conflicts, husbands call on rules and logic, whereas wives 
call on caring. But, when women are in the dominant position, as in parent-child 
conflicts, they emphasize rules while their children appeal for sympathy and un­
derstanding or for exceptions based on special circumstances. This suggests that 
rationality and relatedness are not gender-linked traits, hut rather stances evoked 
by one’s position in a social hierarchy.
Others have offered related accounts of how women’s greater concern with rela­
tionships might be a consequence of women’s position in the social hierarchy 
rather than an essential female attribute. Wilden (1972), for example, proposes 
that low social status imparts a need to monitor where one stands in a relation­
ship: “Anyone in a social relationship which defines him or her as inferior must
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necessarily be much more concerned to discover what the relationship is about 
than to communicate or receive any particular message within it” (297).
Women’s caring is but one example of a behavior that has been represented as a 
gender difference but can be more adequately represented as a way of negotiating 
from a position of low power. As Bernice Lott discusses below, many other differ­
ences between men and women are best construed as stances associated with their 
relative positions in the social hierarchy rather than as differences of gender per 
se. These alternative accounts open the way for psychologists to consider why ev­
ery woman is not concerned with caring and relationships and why some men
are. • 1 r 1Feminist psychodynamic theories make assertions of extensive male-temale
personality differences throughout life. Even when these theories applaud the 
personality attributes of women, they can serve as justification for restricting in­
dividuals to a particular social place. Further, critics have challenged the idea that 
a brief period in infancy could be responsible for creating the broad-ranging dif­
ferences that psychodynamic theorists assert and overriding subsequent experi­
ences in human development. Critics similarly challenge whether personality dif­
ferences alone could be responsible for the gendering of all social institutions 
throughout history (cf. Kagan, 1984; Lott, 1987; Scott, 1985); that is, feminist psy­
chodynamic theories have been criticized for overplaying the influence of early 
experience and individual personality to the neglect of economic conditions, so­
cial role conditioning, and historical change.
A further question has been raised as to whether changes in patterns of infant 
care-giving such as Nancy Chodorow (1978) and Dorothy Dinnerstein (1976) pro­
pose are sufficient to undermine gender difference and thereby to effect social 
transformation. There is an uncomfortable literalism in imputing such power to 
such a small segment of experience. Joan Scott (1985) has drawn attention to this 
problem in terms of representing the well-ordered family as the foundation of a 
well-ordered society.
In focusing on the question of why differences exist, feminist psychodynamic 
theories disregard the question of why domination exists. Iris Young (1983) points 
out that psychodynamic theories posit a masculine desire for power but fail to ac­
count for how men achieve power. The identification of a problem does not con­
stitute an explanation.
Alpha bias, the exaggerating of differences between groups, has the additional 
consequence of ignoring or minimizing the extent of differences (or variability) 
among members of each group. The focus on Woman obliterates the sight of 
women. Further, such outgroups as women are viewed as more homogeneous 
than dominant groups (Park & Rothbart, 1982). Differences among men are read­
ily identified, but all women are regarded as pretty much the same. Thus, men are 
viewed as individuals, but women are viewed as women. As a result, most psycho­
logical theories of gender have been slow to concern themselves with differences 
among women that are due to race, ethnicity, class, age, marital status, and a vari­
ety of social circumstances.
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Another consequence of alpha bias is the tendency to view men and women 
not only as different but as opposite. The conception of masculine and feminine 
as embodying opposite and mutually exclusive traits is not only prevalent in the 
culture at large, but it has been embedded in certain well-established psychologi­
cal tests. These include the Terman-Miles (1936) Masculinity-Femininity Person­
ality Scale (m-f), the California Personality Inventory (Gough, 1964), and the 
Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (Hathaway & McKinley, 1943). The 
existence of these scales testifies to fifty years of psychological effort to evaluate 
the constructs of masculinity and femininity, an unrelenting search for the pre­
sumed core of what defines masculine and feminine (Morawski, 1987). Anne 
Constantinople (1973) has questioned the usefulness of the m-f construct, point­
ing out the vague definitions used in test construction: m-f is defined as whatever 
masculinity-femininity tests measure. She concluded that such tests merely mea­
sured the differences in the responses of men and women.
These tests are constructed so that a respondent must disavow feminine quali­
ties in order to be categorized as masculine and vice versa. Thus, masculinity- 
femininity is represented as a single bipolar dimension, a unitary continuum. 
Masculinity and femininity are defined in terms of one another; what one is, the 
other is not.
Such dichotomies caricature human experience; for example, to maintain the 
illusion of male autonomy, the contribution of women’s work at home and in the 
workplace must be overlooked. Feminist social scientists have observed that 
women and the family have been asked to compensate for the indifference and 
hostility of the outer world. Thus, the home is viewed as a haven (Lasch, 1977), 
but it is actually that women are the haven for men. The home is a metaphor that 
serves to obscure men’s dependence on women and thus perpetuates the illusion 
of male autonomy. Similarly, the corporate world is seen as the locus of men’s 
achievement and independence, but this overlooks the contribution of women. 
The extent to which female support personnel, such as secretaries and reception­
ists, cover up their bosses’ absences and shortcomings, administer their work day, 
and provide personal service is obscured. In both cases, women are expected to 
provide for men’s physical needs and mediate their social relations.
The portrayal of women as relational also ignores the complexity of their expe­
riences. Rearing children involves achievement, and nurturing others involves 
power over those in one’s care (Hare-Mustin & Marecek, 1986). When gender is 
represented as dichotomized traits, the extent to which presumed opposites in­
clude aspects of each other is overlooked. It is of interest to note that when 
women enter the “man’s world” of business, they often flounder at first because 
they assume it operates according to formal rules and principles, they underesti­
mate the importance of informal relationships, reciprocal favors, and personal in­
fluence.
Gender dichotomies regarding work and housework also caricature the actual 
experiences of both housewives and working women. In industrialized societies 
one’s value is associated with the money one earns. Those who do not earn 
money—housewives, children, and old people—have an ambiguous status
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(Hare-Mustin, 1978). The contemporary focus on industrial production has led to 
the belief that households no longer produce anything important, and conse­
quently that housewives no longer have much to do. But what exists is better rep­
resented as a two-tiered production system in which work for money is carried on 
outside the home while a familial production system continues within. As Ruth 
Schwartz Cowan (1983) has pointed out, women produce without payment meals, 
clean laundry, healthy children, well-fed adults, and transportation for goods and 
people at a level unknown in past times. Yet paid workers are seen as productive 
and housewives are not.
The view of male and female as opposite also supports the idea of separate 
spheres. The idea of separate spheres lives on, even though the majority of women 
are now in the paid labor force and operate in both spheres. A false symmetry em­
bodied in the notion of separate spheres obscures women’s dual roles and work 
overload (Hare-Mustin, 1988).
The representation of gender as dichotomies or opposites has had a long his­
tory in human thought. Even the autonomy-relatedness dichotomy was 
foreshadowed by earlier dichotomies such as agentic-communal (Bakan, 1966) 
and instrumental expressive (Parsons & Bales, 1955). Indeed, man-woman may 
serve as a universal binary opposition. If so, this is not the result simply of a faulty 
definition, but as Wilden (1972) says, of prevailing ideology. The representation of 
gender as opposition has its source not in some accidental confusion of logical 
typing, but in the dominant group’s interest in preserving the status quo. Calling 
the psychosocial and economic relations of men and women opposition imputes 
symmetry to a relationship that is unequal. As Dorothy Dinnerstein (1976) 
pointed out, women have been discontent with the double standard, but men on 
the whole are satisfied with it. Further, denying the interrelationships between 
male and female serves to maintain inequality.
Alpha bias, or exaggerating differences, thus plays an important role in preserv­
ing the status quo. Perhaps for this reason, the mass media often promulgate rep­
resentations of gender that emphasize difference and underplay those that mini­
mize difference. As Martha Mednick (1989) documents, the media have given 
extensive coverage to women’s difference, such as their “fear of success,” their lack 
of a “math gene,” and their “different voice.” Similarly, popular self-help books 
appeal to women’s supposedly greater expressiveness, empathy, and sensitivity, 
while holding women responsible for all that goes wrong in intimate relationships 
(Worrell, 1988). Points of similarity between women and men do not make news, 
nor are refutations of exaggerated claims of male-female difference considered 
newsworthy.
The Utility of Beta Bias
Beta bias, or minimizing differences, also has consequences for understanding 
gender, but its consequences have received less attention. On the positive side, 
equal treatment under the law has enabled women to gain greater access to educa­
tional and occupational opportunities, as well as equal pay for equal work. This is
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largely responsible for the improvement in the status of some women over the last 
two decades (Dionne, 1989).
Arguing for no differences between women and men, however, draws attention 
away from women’s special needs and from differences in power and resources 
between women and men. A ready example is seen in the statutes legislating equal 
pay for equal work, which have had relatively little effect on equalizing incomes 
across gender. This is because most women work in female-identified sectors of 
the economy in which wages are low. In a society in which one group holds most 
of the power, ostensibly neutral actions usually benefit members of that group. In 
Lenore Weitzman’s (1985) research, for example, no-fault divorce settlements were 
found to have raised men’s standard of living 42 percent while lowering that of 
women and children 73 percent. Another example is the effort to promote public 
policies granting comparable parental leave for mothers and fathers of newborns. 
Such policies overlook the physical effects of giving birth from which women 
need to recuperate and the demands of breastfeeding that are met uniquely by 
women who nurse their infants.
Giving birth is, paradoxically, both an ordinary event and an extraordinary 
one, as well as the only visible biological link in the kinship system. The failure of 
the workplace to accommodate women’s special needs associated with childbirth 
represents beta bias, in which male needs and behaviors set the norm, and wom­
en’s unique experiences are overlooked.
In therapy, treating men and women as if they were equal is not always equita­
ble (Gilbert, 1980; Margolin, Talovic, Fernandez & Onorato, 1983). In marital and 
family therapy, treating partners as equals can overlook structural inequalities 
within the relationship. Some family systems theorists have tried to dismiss the 
concept of power as an epistemological error, arguing that both partners in a rela­
tionship contribute to the maintenance of the relationship. The notion of reci­
procity, however, implies that the participants are not only mutually involved but 
equally involved in maintaining the interaction, and that they can equally influ­
ence its outcome (MacKinnon 8c Miller, 1987). As Virginia Goldner points out, 
this is not unlike the “kind of moral relativism in which the elegant truth that 
master and slave are psychologically interdependent drifts into the morally re­
pugnant and absurd notion that the two are therefore equals” (1987,111). As long 
as the social status and economic resources of the husband exceed those of the 
wife, marital contracts and quid pro quo bargaining strategies for resolving con­
flicts between partners will not lead to equitable results. Sex-fair or gender-neutral 
therapies that advocate nonpreferential and nondifferential treatment of women 
and men to achieve formal equality can inadvertently foster inequality (Bernal 8c 
Ysern, 1986; Jacobson, 1983; Marecek 8c Kravetz, 1977).
Our purpose in examining representations of gender has not been to catalogue 
every possible consequence of alpha and beta bias but to demonstrate that repre­
sentation is never neutral. From the vantage point of constructivism, theories of 
gender can be seen as representations that construct our knowledge of men and 
women and inform social and scientific practice. Gender selects and gives mean­
ing to sexual differences. Deconstruction provides another approach for examin-
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ing representation and meaning in language. We now turn to the ways in which 
deconstruction can he used to examine the meanings of gender in the practice of 
therapy.
Deconstruction
Just as constructivism denies that there is a single fixed reality, the approach to lit­
erary interpretation known as deconstruction denies that texts have a single fixed 
meaning. Deconstruction offers a means of examining the way language operates 
outside our everyday awareness to create meaning (Culler, 1982). Deconstruction 
is generally applied to literary texts, but it can be applied equally to scientific 
texts, or, as we suggest below, to therapeutic discourse.
A primary tenet of deconstruction is that texts can generate a variety of mean­
ings in excess of what is intended. In this view, language is not a stable system of 
correspondences of words to objects but “a sprawling limitless web where there is 
constant circulation of elements” (Eagleton, 1983, 129). The meaning of a word 
depends on its relation to other words, specifically, its difference from other 
words.
Deconstruction is based on the philosophy of Derrida, who moves beyond the 
structuralist thesis that posits closed language systems. Derrida has pointed out 
that Western thought is built on a series of interrelated hierarchical oppositions, 
such as reason-emotion, presence-absence, fact-value, good-evil, male-female 
(Culler, 1982). In each pair, the terms take their meaning from their opposition to 
(or difference from) each other; each is defined in terms of what the other is not. 
The first member of each pair is considered “more valuable and a better guide to 
the truth” (Nehamas, 1987, 32). But Derrida challenges both the opposition and 
the hierarchy, drawing attention to how each term contains elements of the other 
and depends for its meaning on the other. It is only by marginalizing their simi­
larities that their meaning as opposites is stabilized and the value of one over the 
other is sustained.
Just as the meaning of a word partly depends on what the word is not, the 
meaning of a text partly depends on what the text does not say. Deconstructive 
readings thus rely on gaps, inconsistencies, and contradictions in the text, and 
even on metaphorical associations. Deconstruction can serve as a tool for probing 
what psychology has represented as oppositions, such as autonomy-nurturance, 
instrumentality-expressiveness, mental health-mental illness. Our intention here 
is not to provide a detailed explication of deconstruction but to suggest some 
ways that it can be used to understand meaning and gender. Our focus here is on 
psychotherapy.
Therapy, Meaning, and Change
Therapy centers on meaning, and language is its medium. Therapy is an oral 
mode, and narratives, proverbs, metaphors, and interpretations are its substance. 
The metaphorical language used in therapy to represent the world is a way to try
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to comprehend partially what cannot he comprehended totally (Spence, r987). A 
deconstructivist view of the process of therapy draws attention to the play of 
meanings in the therapist-client dialogue and the way a therapist poses alternative 
meanings to create possibilities for change. This renegotiation of the client’s 
meanings can take place explicitly, as in psychodynamic therapies, cognitive ther­
apy, or rational-emotive therapy. Or it can take place implicitly, as when a behav­
ior therapist instructs a client on how to bring anxiety symptoms under volun­
tary control, or a pharmacotherapist reattributes symptoms of depression to 
disturbances in body chemistry. The therapeutic process can be seen as one in 
which the client asks the therapist to reveal something about the client beyond the 
client’s awareness, something that the client does not know.
Clients in therapy talk not about actual experiences but about reconstructed 
memories that resemble the original experiences only in certain ways. The client’s 
story conforms to prevailing narrative conventions (Spence, 1982). This means 
that the client’s representation of events moves further and further away from the 
experience and into a descriptive mode. The client as narrator is a creator of his 
or her world, not a disinterested observer.
The therapist’s task of listening and responding to the client’s narratives is akin 
to a deconstructive reading of a text. Both seek subtexts and multiple levels of 
meaning. Just as deconstructive readings disrupt the frame of reference that orga­
nizes conventional meanings of a text, so a therapist’s interventions disrupt the 
frame of reference within which the client customarily sees the world. Such dis­
ruptions enable new meanings to emerge (Watzlawick, Weakland & Fisch, 1974). 
As a multiplicity of meanings becomes apparent through such therapist actions as 
questioning, explaining, interpreting, and disregarding, more possibilities for 
change emerge. The deconstructive process is most apparent in psychoanalysis, 
but, indeed, all therapy involves changing meaning as part of changing behavior. 
The metaphor of therapy as healing is an idealization that obscures another meta­
phor, that therapists manipulate meanings. These metaphors are not contrary to 
each other; rather, as part of helping clients change, therapists change clients’ 
meanings (Frank, 2976; Haley, 1987).
Gender and Meaning in Therapy
Just as a poem can have many readings, a client’s experience can have many 
meanings. Certain meanings are privileged, however, because they conform to the 
explanatory systems of the dominant culture. As a cultural institution whose pur­
pose is to help individuals adapt to their social condition, therapy usually reflects 
and promulgates such privileged meanings. But some therapists, such as radical 
therapists and feminist therapists, bring a social critique to their work. Such ther­
apists, rather than attempting to bring clients’ meanings in line with those of the 
culture, disrupt the meanings privileged by the culture. Below, we examine cer­
tain privileged and marginalized meanings in relation to gender issues, issues that 
have been at the center of considerable debate among therapists and in society at 
large (Brodsky 8c Hare-Mustin, t98o).
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We begin with Freud’s classic case of Dora (1963). When we look at Dora’s case 
from a deconstructive perspective, we can see it as a therapist’s attempt to adjust 
the meaning a client attached to her experience to match the prevailing meanings 
of the patriarchal society in which she lived. A “landmark of persuasion unsur­
passed in clinical literature” is the way Spence described Dora’s case (1987,122). 
Dora viewed the sexual attentions of her father’s associate, Herr K, as unwanted 
and uninvited. She responded to them with revulsion. Freud insistently reframed 
the sexual encounters with Herr K as desired and desirable for a fourteen-year-old 
girl and interpreted Dora’s revulsion as a disguise for her true state of sexual 
arousal. When Dora refused to accept Freud’s construction, he labeled her as 
vengeful and declared therapy a failure.
From our vantage point ninety years after Dora’s encounter with Freud, the 
case shows how meanings embedded in the dominant culture often go unrecog­
nized or unacknowledged. Freud evidently viewed Herr K’s lecherous advances as 
acceptable behavior, although Herr K was married and Dora was only fourteen 
and the daughter of a close family friend. We can surmise that the cultural belief 
in the primacy of men’s sexual needs prevented Freud from seeing Dora’s revul­
sion as genuine.
Freud’s analysis of Dora provides an example of how a therapist attempts to re­
affirm privileged meanings and marginalize and discourage other meanings, to 
fill in the gaps and make intelligible a narrative. Where does Dora leave off and 
Freud begin? The many meanings of Dora’s behavior—and Freud’s as well—are 
evident in the numerous reanalyses, filmic representations, and critical literary 
readings of the case, which continue to be produced up to the present day.
Conventional meanings of gender are embedded in the language of therapy. 
Like all language, the language used in therapy can he thought of as metaphoric: it 
selects, emphasizes, suppresses, and organizes certain features of experience, and 
thus it imparts meaning to experience; for example, Oedipus complex imposes the 
complexity of adult erotic feelings onto the experiences of small children and em­
phasizes the male and the primacy of the phallus. The metaphor of the family led­
ger in family therapy implies that family relations are (or should be) organized as 
mercantile exchanges and centered on male achievements (Boszormenyi-Nagy 8c 
Sparks, 1973).
Dominant meanings are often embedded in everyday language and 
commonplace metaphors. By challenging linguistic conventions and unpacking 
metaphors, therapists can disrupt these meanings. With respect to gender, for ex­
ample, a therapist can unpack the metaphor of family harmony and expose the 
gender hierarchy by pointing out that accord within the family often is main­
tained by women’s acquiescence and accommodation (Haavind, 1984; Hare- 
Mustin, 1978; 1987). Moreover, the stress generated by women’s prescribed family 
roles is often marginalized or overlooked (Baruch, Biener 8c Barnett, 1987). Psy­
chologists studying stress have focused largely on men with men’s workplace 
identified as a stressor. The home, in contrast, has been viewed as a benign envi-
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ronment in which one recuperates from work. This picture is drawn from a male 
perspective. For most women, the home is the workplace or at least one of their 
workplaces. Further, women’s roles associated with the home are not free of un­
due stress. Family harmony involves a woman’s pleasing a husband and keeping a 
home attractive, activities that are frequently incompatible with meeting chil­
dren’s needs (Piotrkowski & Repetti, 1984).
In unpacking the metaphor of family loyalty, the therapist can draw attention 
to the way the needs of some family members are subordinated to those of domi­
nant members in the name of loyalty. In maintaining the ties in the family net­
work, women provide for others while their own needs go unmet (Belle, 1982).
The metaphor of women’s dependency can also serve to conceal the extent to 
which women as wives and mothers provide for the needs of men and boys. 
Women have traditionally been characterized as dependent, but Harriet Lerner 
(1983) raises the provocative questions: Have women been dependent enough? 
Have they been able to call on others to meet their needs? As Westkott (1986) ob- 
serves,the assumption of male entitlement to unconditional nurturance from fe­
males is rarely questioned; nor is it labeled as dependency and regarded as a psy­
chological problem.
Finally, both private concerns with preserving the family and public rhetoric 
about the decline of the family can be challenged by drawing attention to the use 
of “the family” as a metaphor for male dominance (Pogrebin, 1983). Is it the fam­
ily that is threatened or just a form of the family that supports men’s greater 
power and status? Judith Stacey (1983) also draws attention to the way feminist 
theory has deconstructed the family as a natural unit and reconstructed it as a so­
cial unit.
As we have shown, the resemblance of therapeutic discourse to narrative offers 
the possibility of using deconstruction as a resource for understanding meaning 
and the process of therapy. Therapy typically confirms privileged meanings, but 
deconstruction directs attention to marginalized meanings. Doing therapy from a 
feminist standpoint is like the deconstructionist’s “reading as a woman” (Culler, 
1982). The therapist exposes gender-related meanings that reside in such cultur­
ally embedded metaphors as family harmony but go unacknowledged in the con­
ventional understanding of those metaphors. These new meanings can change the 
ways that clients understand their own behaviors and the behaviors of others— 
the click experience that women in the consciousness-raising groups of the 1960s 
and 1970S so often reported. New meanings allow and often impel clients to make 
changes in their lives.
Paradoxes in Gender Theorizing
The issue of gender differences has been a divisive one for feminist scholars. Some 
believe that affirming difference affirms women’s value and special nature. Others 
believe that insisting on equality (that is, no difference) is necessary for social
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change and the redistribution of power and privilege. But both ways of represent­
ing gender involve paradoxes. Like every representation, both conceal as they re­
veal. A paradox is contrary (para) to received opinion (doxa), a logical impossibil­
ity or a result contrary to what is desired.
One such paradox is that efforts to affirm the special value of women’s experi­
ence and to valorize women’s inner life turn attention away from efforts to change 
the material conditions of women’s lives (Fine, 1985; Russ, 1986; Tobias, 1986). 
Feelings of emotional intensity may not lead to an understanding of oneself or of 
society. A change in consciousness and symbolic life alone does not necessarily 
produce a change in the social conditions of individuals’ lives and institutional 
structures.
Another paradox arises from the assertion of a female way of knowing, involv­
ing intuition and experiential understanding rather than logical abstraction. This 
assertion implies that all other ways of knowing are male. If taken to an extreme, 
the privileging of emotion and bodily knowledge over reason can lead to the re­
jection of rational thought. It can also be taken to imply that women are incapa­
ble of rational thought and of acquiring the knowledge of the dominant culture.
There is yet another paradox. Qualities such as caring, expressiveness, and con­
cern for relationships are extolled as women’s superior virtues and the wellspring 
of public regeneration and morality. But they are also seen as arising from wom­
en’s subordination (Miller, 1976) and from women’s being outsiders and op­
pressed. Thus has Bertrand Russell spoken of the superior virtue of the oppressed. 
When we extol such qualities as women’s caring, do we necessarily also extol 
women’s subordination (Echols, 1983)? Joan Ringleheim (1985) has suggested that 
the idealization of women’s experience serves as a palliative for oppression. If sub­
ordination makes women better people, then the perpetuation of women’s so- 
called goodness would seem to require continued subordination.
It is not only alpha bias that leads to paradoxes and logical confusion. Beta bias 
also can. Saying that women are as good as men is a statement of self-acceptance 
and pride for some women. But asserting that women are equal to men is not the 
same as asserting that women and men are equal; it reveals that man is the hidden 
referent in our language and culture. As Dale Spender (1984) points out, “women 
can only aspire to be as good as a man, there is no point in trying to be as good as 
a woman” (201). Paradoxically, this attempt at denying differences reaffirms male 
behavior as the standard against which all behavior is judged.
There is a paradox faced by any social change movement, including feminism: 
its critique is necessarily determined by the nature of the prevailing social system, 
and its meanings are embedded in that system. Sennett (1980) has observed a fur­
ther paradox, that even when one’s response to authority is defiance, that stance 
serves to confirm authority just as compliance does. Thus, the feminist critique 
simultaneously protests and protects the status quo. In this regard, Dorothy 
Dinnerstein (1976) has suggested that woman is not really the enemy of the sys­
tem but its loyal opposition.
Moreover, feminist separatism, the attempt to avoid male influence by separat­
ing from men, leaves intact the larger system of male control in the society. Sepa-
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ratism can provide space for self-affection and woman-to-woman bonding, but 
as an ultimate goal it is caught as a mirror image of the masculine reality it is try­
ing to escape (Cornell & Thurschwell, 1987).
The meaning of gender as male-female difference presents us with paradoxes. 
Whether such representations of gender emphasize difference or minimize it, 
they are fraught with logical contradictions and hidden meanings. The represen­
tation of gender as male-female difference obscures and marginalizes the interre­
latedness and commonalities of women and men. It also obscures institutional 
sexism and the extent of male authority. Just as our examination of the utility of 
alpha bias and beta bias revealed no clear answer for those who ask the question 
of which is better, so too the paradoxes that arise reveal further complexities and 
contradictions. Can we look beyond these representations to new ways of under­
standing gender?
Conclusion
Male-female difference is a problematic and paradoxical way to construe gender. 
What we see is that alpha and beta bias have similar assumptive frameworks de­
spite their diverse emphases. Both take the male as the standard of comparison. 
Both construct gender as attributes of individuals, not as the ongoing relations of 
men and women. Neither effectively challenges the gender hierarchy, and ulti­
mately neither transcends the status quo. They are changes within the larger sys­
tem of assumptions, but they leave the system itself unchanged. The multiple rep­
resentations all frame the problem of what gender is in such a way that the 
solution is “more of the same” (Watzlawick, Weakland & Fisch, 1974).
Gender is not a property of individuals but a socially prescribed relationship, a 
process, and a social construction. Like race and class, however, gender cannot be 
renounced voluntarily. Representing gender as a continuum of psychological dif­
ference serves to simplify and purify the concept of gender. The riddle of gender is 
presumed to be solved when heterogeneous material is reduced to the homogene­
ity of logical thought (Gallop, 1982). To establish a dichotomy is to avoid com­
plexity. The idea of gender as opposites obscures the complexity of human action 
and shields both men and women from the discomforting recognition of inequal­
ity.
The issue of difference is salient for men in a way that it is not for women. 
Those who are dominant have an interest in emphasizing those differences that 
reaffirm their superiority and in denying their similarity to subordinate groups. 
By representing nonsymmetrical relationships as symmetrical, those who are 
dominant obscure the unequal social arrangements that perpetuate male domi­
nance. Thus, notions of gender that are part of our cultural heritage rely on de­
fensive masculine models of gender (Chodorow, 1979). In accepting male-female 
difference as the meaning of gender, feminists have acceded to the construction of 
reality of the dominant group, “a gentle slide into the prevailing hegemony” 
(Bouchier, 1979, 397).
70 Rachel T Hare-Mustin & ]eanne Marecek
Even when differences are minimized and gender is represented as male-female 
similarity, equality remains elusive. Male themes and male views are presented as 
human experience. As Sandra Harding (1986) has observed, women are asked to 
degender themselves for a masculine version of experience without asking for a 
similar degendering of men. Even women’s need to define themselves derives 
from and is perpetuated by their being the nondominant group. The dominant 
group does not define itself with respect to its group or order. Thus men do not 
refer to their masculine status, they do not add “as a man.” But women speak “as 
a woman.” Specifying “as a woman” reserves generality for men.
Deconstruction focuses attention on oppositions and hidden meanings in lan­
guage. Language mirrors social relations, but it is also recursive on the social ex­
periences that generate it. Thus, from a postmodernist perspective, there is no 
one right view of gender. Each view is partial and will present certain paradoxes. 
Feminist psychology has concentrated on male-female difference. Though the re­
mapping of difference could go further, such a map of difference, even if per­
fected, will never reveal the entire terrain of gender. A map is not the terrain. 
Rather a map offers a construction of the terrain. With regard to gender, there are 
other maps to be drawn. For instance, some would map gender in terms of the 
principles that organize male-female relations in particular cultures (Stacey & 
Thorne, 1985). Some would map gender in terms of the discourses through which 
men and women position one another and define themselves (Hollway, 1984). 
Other maps, charting gender in yet other terms, are still be be invented.
Postmodernism accepts multiplicity, randomness, incoherence, indeterminacy, 
and paradox, which positivist paradigms are designed to exclude. Postmodernism 
creates distance from the seemingly fixed language of established meanings and 
fosters skepticism about the fixed nature of reality. Recognizing that meaning is 
what we agree on, postmodernism describes a system of possibilities. Construct­
ing gender is a process, not an answer. In using a postmodernist approach, we 
open the possibility of theorizing gender in heretofore unimagined ways. Post­
modernism allows us to see that as observers of gender we are also its creators.
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